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Introduction 
The majority of the world's 23 million 
refugees (Darton 1994, Al) are women 
and their dependants. Most refugee 
claimants in Canada, however, are 
men. Of the 30,000 refugee claimants 
who arrived in Canada in 1993, less 
than one-third were female (see 
Ramirez in this issue). There are sev- 
eral reasons for this discrepancy. Men, 
unencumbered by the care of children 
and the elderly, are more mobile than 
women. They often have greater finan- 
cial resources at their disposal and are 
less vulnerable travelling alone than 
are women. In addition, it is oftenmore 
culturally acceptable for men to travel 
on their own. Finally, it is more diffi- 
cult for women to meet the legal crite- 
ria for obtaining refugee status than it 
is for men. 
The 1951 United Nations Conven- 
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees 
. defines a refugee in Article 1(A)(2) as a 
person who, owing to well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, member- 
ship.in a particular social group, or 
political opinion is outside the country 
of his [her] nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, unwilling to avail 
himself [herself] of the protection of 
that country. 
The gender-neutral language of the 
Convention definition is deceptive. 
Hidden in the neutrality is an under- 
standing of persecution, and the 
grounds upon which it is legally based, 
that has been formulated by a dis- 
tinctly male perception of what consti- 
tutes a legitimate fear of persecution. 
Because gender is absent as an enu- 
merated basis for fear of persecution, 
the Convention definition fails to ac- 
knowledge that in some-perhaps 
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most--countries, women face perse- 
cution specifically because they are 
women (Caste1 1992). 
At both the national and the interna- 
tional levels, several policy documents 
and accompanying statements of in- 
tent have been issued over the past 
decade with the express purpose of 
ameliorating this situation. The Cana- 
dian Women at Risk (AWR) program, 
implemented in 1988, is one such 
policy. The Guidelines on Woman Refu- 
gee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related 
Persecution, issued in March 1993 by 
Chairperson Nu rjehan Mawani of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) 
are another. The Guidelines were pro- 
duced out of concern over the omis- 
sion of gender-specific persecution in 
the Convention definition. The AWR 
program, implemented several years 
before the publication of the Guidelines, 
was designed to "assist refugee 
advocated in the Guidelines for ma- 
nipulating the Convention definition 
so that it may better meet the needs of 
, 
refugee women. Specifically, it is im- 
portant to consider the ramifications of 
assigning women refugees to a cat- 
egory that implicitly if not explicitly 
suggests that gender-specific persecu- 
tion of women refugees is an aberra- 
tion of more conventionally acceptable 
forms of persecution. 
Background to the Release of the 
Guidelines 
According to Chairperson Mawani 
(1993,7), the Guidelines were the inevi- 
table outcome of previous statements 
of policy issued at the international 
level, usually via the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), concerning the omission of 
gender in the Convention definition as 
grounds for persecution. Others, such 
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women who are particularly at risk, 
when this is deemed to be the only vi- 
able durable solution for them" 
(UNHCR memorandum 77/88). To- 
day, only three countries have a 
Women at Risk program: Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. The 
United States is currently beginning a 
pilot project. The Guidelines, in turn, 
are unique to Canada. 
The purpose of this paper is to ex- 
amine and analyze the argument made 
by the IRB in the Guidelines, that 
women refugee claimants can and 
should base their claims-under the 
appropriate circumstances-on the 
grounds of belonging to a particular 
social group as outlined in the Conven- 
tion definition. I am especially con- 
cerned with the line of reasoning 
as refugee lawyer Audrey Macklin 
(1993,l; 1995) suggest that the public 
outcry over the well-publicized rejec- 
tion of several female applicants who 
had based their claims on gender per- 
secution led to the issuance of the 
Guidelines. To some extent, both are 
correct. Recommendations had been 
made at the international level to 
accommodate gender-specific perse- 
cution through a broadened interpre- 
tation of the Convention definition. 
This, in turn, encouraged the establish- 
ment at the IRB of the Working Group 
on Women Refugee Claimants in 1990, 
whose mandate was to address the 
specific problems faced by women 
refugee claimants (see Ramirez in this 
issue). In addition, the outcry over the 
dismissed claims may well have 
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served to give the IRB a final push to 
produce a document such as the Guide- 
lines. 
In 1984, the European Parliament 
adopted a resolution encouraging 
states to recognize as refugees women 
who face persecution because they 
transgressed the social mores of their 
communities (Stairs and Pope 1990). 
Applicants basing their claims on such 
a transgression, the European Parlia- 
ment suggested, could be subsumed 
under the Convention definition cat- 
egory known as "membership in a par- 
ticular social group." This was the first 
time such claims were recognized 
(Goldberg 1993). Shortly thereafter, in 
1985, the Executive Committee of 
UNHCR endorsed Conclusion No. 39, 
"which recognized that states are free 
to adopt an interpretation of social 
group that would include women asy- 
lum seekers 'who face harsh or inhu- 
man treatment due to their having 
transgressed the social mores of the 
society in which they live' " (Stairs and 
Pope 1990,167). Then, in 1988, the In- 
ternational Consultation on Refugee 
Women in Geneva--echoing the ear- 
lier actions of the European Parlia- 
ment-called upon all states that are 
signatories of the 1967 Protocol to con- 
sider women persecuted on the basis 
of gender as part of a "particular social 
group." Finally, in 1991, the UNHCR 
adopted the "Guidelines on the Pro- 
tection of Refugee Women," which 
also encouraged states to recognize 
claims made by women on the grounds 
of gender-specific persecution. The 
UNHCR Guidelines recommended 
that such persecution could fall under 
the "political opinion" or, in some 
cases, the "religious" category speci- 
fied by the Convention definition 
(Goldberg 1993). 
These policy statements and accom- 
panying documents, with the excep- 
tion of the 1991 UNHCR Guidelines, 
reiterate the notion that women refu- 
gees can be understood as constituting 
a particular social group. By the time 
the Guidelines were released in March 
1993, it was hardly surprising that 
rather than advocate that "gender" be 
added as legitimate grounds for bas- 
ing a refugee claim, the IRB recom- 
mended instead that, barring other 
options already stated explicitly in the 
Convention definition, women refu- 
gee claimants should declare them- 
selves as belonging to a "particular 
social group" in order to justify their 
refugee status. The IRB Guidelines thus 
follow the precedent set during the 
1980s by the European Parliament, the 
UNHCR, and the 1988 International 
Consultation on Refugee Women. 
Refugee Women as a Particular 
Social Group 
The UN refugee definition acknowl- 
edges persecution based only on pub- 
licly apparent enumerated grounds 
that often do not reflect the private re- 
ality of women's lives. Moreover, the 
definition requires a state connection 
to the persecution feared (Stairs and 
Pope 1990). Traditionally, argues 
Goldberg (1993), human rights doc- 
trines-which include the Convention 
definitionhave focused on the hu- 
man rights of men. The "objective 
standard" of what constitutes a human 
rights violation refers to the male expe- 
rience as the norm. Because this male 
cause of their sex. This is not random 
violence; the risk factor is being fe- 
male." 
The express purpose of the Guide- 
lines is to compensate for the Conven- 
tion definition's omission of gender- 
related persecution. The opening 
statement of the Guidelines declares 
gender-related persecution as a "form 
of persecution which can and should 
be assessed by the Refugee Division 
panel hearing the claim. . . . The central 
issue is . . . the need to determine the 
linkage between gender, the feared 
persecution and one or more of the 
definition grounds" (Guidelines 1993, 
1). In reference to the Guidelines, Chair- 
person Mawani writes, "the IRB is 
seeking to apply the notion of persecu- 
tion in a way that reflects the reality of 
persecution against women, an aim 
not fully envisaged at the time of the 
adoption of the Convention" (1993,8). 
There is increasing international 
support, the Guidelines (1993,s) point 
out, "for the application of the particu- 
lar social group ground to the claims of 
women who allege a fear of persecu- 
tion solely by reason of their gender." 
The Guidelines go on to outline the cir- 
The IRB Guidelines thus follow the precedent set during the 
1980s by the European Parliament, the UNHCR, and the 1988 
International Consultation on Refigee Women. 
point of view has determined the 
measurement of aberrant behavior, 
gender-based violations are not ac- 
counted for (Ibid.). Examples of gen- 
der-based human rights violations are 
rape (which has not historically been 
considered grounds for claiming refu- 
gee status), dowry deaths (for brides 
who bring too few resources to their 
marriage), sati (practice of a widow 
immolating herself on her husband's 
funeral pyre), forced marriages, com- 
pulsory abortion or sterilization, fe- 
male infanticide, genital mutilation, 
and domestic violence, all of which 
"represent female specific forms of 
persecution for which there are few 
male corollaries" (Guidelines 1993, 7). 
As Heise writes in the Guidelines, 
"women are targets of violence be- 
cumstances under which membership 
in a particular social group would be 
the appropriate course for a claim to 
take. Four factors must be considered 
when establishing a well-founded fear 
of persecution by reason of member- 
ship in a social group: first, the possi- 
bility that a particular social group 
might consist of a large population is 
irrelevant; second, that the particular 
social group suffers, or fears suffering, 
severe discrimination such that the 
group can be distinguished from the 
rest of the general population, or from 
other women (emphasis added); third, 
that the particular group can be identi- 
fied by their exposure to violence-in- 
cluding domestic violence-and 
further, that their exposure as women 
is due, in part or entirely, to the fact 
- - - 
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that they are unprotected; and fourth, 
that gender can be shownto be the sole 
reason for feared harm, that the harm 
is persecutory in nature, and that the 
claimant has reason to fear a continua- 
tion of that harm were she to return to 
her country of origin in lieu of ad- 
equate state protection. 
The following example demon- 
strates the application of the social 
group category in accordance with the 
dictates of the Guidelines. "Dularie," a 
woman from Trinidad, fled her home- 
land for Canada after having been re- 
peatedly beaten for a number of years 
by her husband. Despite her pleas, the 
state authorities of Trinidad refused to 
intervene. Using the particular social 
group category, the grounds for perse- 
cution, theoretically, could be 
"Trinidadian women" or "Trinidadian 
women with male partners" thereby 
justdying "Dularie's" claim for refu- 
gee status (Macklin 1993,17). 
In other words, in instances where 
one's gender appears to be directly re- 
lated to some form of persecution, such 
as sexual abuse, genital mutilation, 
forced abortion, or the practice of 
"sati," one should claim that one be- 
longs to a particular social group. In 
this way, women who have experi- 
enced, or fear they will experience, any 
form of gender-specific persecution 
may be recognized as legitimate refu- 
gee claimants. 
According to the Guidelines, basing 
a refugee claim on the ground of par- 
ticular social group is not necessarily 
the best option. A preferable course of 
action might be to match a claim with 
the other four grounds for persecution, 
i.e. race, nationality, religion, or politi- 
cal opinion. For example, a Saudi Ara- 
bian woman, "Nada," was subjected to 
severe harassment for refusing to wear 
a veil (Macklin 1993,l). According to 
the Guidelines, "[a] woman who in an  
Islamic society . . . chooses not to sub- 
scribe to or follow the precepts of a 
state religion may be at risk of persecu- 
tion for reasons of religion. In the con- 
text of the Convention refugee 
definition, the notion of religion may 
encompass ... the freedom . . . not tohold 
a particular belief system and the free- 
dom . . . not to practise a prescribed reli- 
gion" (1993, 4). "Nada," then, could 
base her claim to refugee status on re- 
ligious grounds. 
Critique of Women Refugee 
Claims Based on the Ground of 
Particular Social Group 
While Goldberg (1993) and, in a quali- 
fied way, Macklin (1993; 1995) argue 
that basing a refugee claim on the 
grounds of belonging to a particular 
social group is a poor substitute for 
what is clearly an instance of gender- 
based persecution, others (Stairs and 
Pope 1990) argue that all women 
should be recognized as constituting a 
particular social group. On this view, 
women form a social group because 
they share certain immutable charac- 
teristics and because they are fre- 
quently treated differently from men. 
tic abuse. Had the authors considered 
this possibility, Macklin suggests, the 
boundaries between groups of women 
would become increasingly blurred. In 
the end, one would probably concede 
that women, as a whole, could be con- 
sidered as constituting a particular so- 
cial group. 
At this juncture, Goldberg expresses 
her disappointment that "gender" was 
not simply added to the Convention 
definition of a refugee as a sixth 
ground for basing a fear of persecu- 
tion. A new category, she argues, 
would more fully recognize women 
who fear or experience gender-specific 
persecution (1993,302). Macklin (1993, 
29; 1995) writes that "the feature of the 
Guidelines which is most vexing from a 
feminist perspective is the failure of the 
Government to simply add gender to 
the list of grounds of persecution 
The implication is that women refugees, by virtue of being 
female, are perennial victims and therefore belong to a 
particular social group; women are thus put in the 
uncomfortable position of having their biological characteristics 
determine their helplessness and subsequent legal status. 
Women are also easily identifiable as a 
group. A combination of biological 
and social characteristics, then, 
renders women a particular social 
group within the meaning of the Con- 
vention definition. Caste1 adds that 
women, in general, could be under- 
stood as forming a particular social 
group by virtue of their lack of power 
within most societies. Women may be 
classified as belonging to the group of 
"the disempowered relative to men 
who, as a group, occupy a privileged 
position in society" (Caste1 1992,52). 
The Guidelines advise restricting the 
size of a social group so that it may be 
delineated from the rest of the popula- 
tion or from other women. It is not en- 
tirely clear why the Guidelines have 
stressed this. Macklin (1993; 1995) 
cynically speculates that those who 
authored the Guidelines did so on the 
assumption that Canada would never 
qualify as a state that did not ad- 
equately protect women from domes- 
rather than opting for a re-interpreta- 
tion of existing categories." That this 
course of action has not been taken, 
claims Macklin (1993), implies that 
women refugee problems are a subtle 
variation of men's. Forced abortion, 
forced pregnancy, or forced clitori- 
dectomy have no parallel in male 
experience. "Not naming it . . . 
trivializes gender oppression as less 
damaging than race or religious perse- 
cution, and perpetuates the invisibility 
of its victims" (Macklin 1993,30). Adds 
Goldberg, "[all1 forms of gender-based 
persecution of women should be rec- 
ognized by refugee laws. It is essential 
to a humane asylum policy" (1993, 
302). 
Macklin qualifies her reaction, 
however, by pointing to the Guidelines 
suggestion that opposition to institu- 
tionalized discrimination may consti- 
tute the expression of "political 
opinion." If this is the case, then a range 
of possibilities open up to womenrefu- 
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gee claimants, allowing them to base 
their claims on the ground of political 
opinion. According to Macklin (1993, 
32; 1995), "naming women's rejection 
of subordinate status as a political 
opinion strikes me as profoundly femi- 
nist, if indeed we believe that 'the per- 
sonal is political' and that patriarchy is 
a system of power, not biology. So in 
the end I am not persuaded that em- 
ploying the category of 'political opin- 
ion' is unambiguously inferior to 
adding the category of gender to the 
list." 
Having established the desirability 
of basing a claim on the ground of po- 
litical opinion, Macklin returns to the 
notion of "particular social group." 
Women, she observes, are not the only 
ones left out of the Convention defini- 
tion of a refugee. For example, persons 
with disabilities may also be perse- 
cuted: "[tlhe risk of listing gender as a 
separate category is that it will give 
[IRB] Members an excuse to reject peo- 
ple persecuted for reasons of disability 
by arguing that if the legislator had in- 
tended to include disability as a 
ground of persecution, it would have 
said so explicitly as it did with gender" 
(Macklin 1993, 33; 1995). Hence the 
appeal, for Macklin, of women refu- 
gees basing a claim on the ground of 
particular social group-a very differ- 
ent argument from that of the Guide- 
lines or Stairs and Pope (1990), yet 
drawing the same conclusions. 
I find Macklin's argument in favour 
of resorting to "particular social 
group" in claims of gender-based per- 
secution less than persuasive. First, she 
leaves herself open to her own ciiti- 
cism of "masking" gender persecution 
with "some other label" (1993, 30; 
1995). Second, invoking a particulai 
ground for persecution does not pre- 
clude the recognition of other grounds 
as well. Invoking gender as a ground 
for persecution does not mean that 
other forms of persecution do not 
therefore exist any more than the in- 
voking of, say, religion, as a ground for 
persecution necessarily implies that 
race is not, therefore, also a source of 
persecution. Third, Macklin seems to 
suggest that persecution is not ac- 
knowledged as such when aimed at 
someone who is disabled. Because 
Macklin does not refer to any exam- 
ples of such cases, I remain sceptical of 
the pervasiveness of this problem. On 
the other hand, examples of women 
suffering unrecognized forms of per- 
secution, such as rape, abound. Hence 
the need for the Guidelines in the first 
place. 
I believe it is more likely that women 
will be equated with "particular social 
group" in a broadened interpretation 
of the Convention definition, than that 
gender will be incorporated into the 
UN definition of a refugee as a sixth 
ground for basing a fear of persecu- 
tion. As mentioned above, the Guide- 
lines specify that, for women refugee 
claimants to accurately base a fear of 
persecution on the grounds of belong- 
ing to a particular social group, that 
group should suffer, or fear suffering, 
severe discrimination such that the 
group can be distinguished from the 
rest of the general population, or from 
other women. The word "or" suggests 
that, should the group be indistin- 
guishable from other women-in the 
manner, for example, described by 
Caste1 in which women, in general, can 
be thought of as "disempowered rela- 
tive to menu-an argument could still 
be made justifying the use of particular 
social group as a legitimate basis for a 
refugee claim concerning gender-spe- 
cific persecution. 
The "particular" group classifica- 
tion strongly implies that women be 
categorized and sub-categorized in a 
manner suggesting that refugee 
women, despite their majority status 
among the global refugee population, 
are an aberration from the norm, as 
Macklin initially suggests. The impli- 
cation is that women refugees, by vir- 
tue of being femaie, are perennial 
victims and therefore belong to a par- 
ticular social group; women are thus 
put in the uncomfortable position of 
having their biological characteristics 
determine their helplessness and sub- 
sequent legal status. 
In addition, the classification of 
women as a "social" group is deeply 
problematic. Phelan (1989, 57) claims 
that one cannot speak of Women as a 
specific social entity. To do so is to ig- 
nore class and cultural differences. To 
suggest, as Caste1 (1992) and Stairs and 
Pope (1990) do, that women in general 
may constitute a particular social group 
reveals a certain cultural image or 
stereotype that is affixed in our society 
to a specific arrangement of anatomi- 
cal features. Feminism, cautions Butler 
(1990), sometimes entails an urgency 
to establish a universal status for patri- 
archy, what Butler (1990, 3) calls a 
"fictive universality of the structure of 
domination, held to produce women's 
common subjugated experience." It is 
this professed "common subjugated 
experience" that permits, at least in 
part, the categorization of women as a 
social group. However, as Butler 
points out, the political task for femi- 
nism is not to refuse representational 
politics-which, for the purposes of 
this paper, I think of in reference to the 
representation of women as a social 
group for the sake of the political proc- 
ess of refugee determination-since 
"juridical structures of language and 
politics constitute the contemporary 
field of power" (1990, 5). Butler sug- 
gests that, instead, one may posit a cri- 
tique of the categories of identity that 
"contemporary juridical structures 
engender, naturalize, and immobilize" 
(1990,5). This is precisely where Caste1 
(1992), Stairs and Pope (1990), and 
even Macklin (1993) fall short when 
they, each in her own particular way, 
group women together as a single so- 
cial entity either epistemologically 
(Castel) or legally (Stairs and Pope; 
Macklin; the Guidelines). 
So, although they may be labelled as 
a "particular social group," women 
are, in fact, no such thing. The label is 
affixed in order to steer women 
through a system which, in part be- 
cause of the very methodology advo- 
cated by the Guidelines, remains 
profoundly masculinist in outlook. As 
long as this is the case, claims put for- 
ward by women refugees in response 
to gender-specific persecution will 
continue to be regarded as something 
derivative from the norm and, assum- 
ing that one's biology dictates one's 
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social status for the sake of the legal 
system, women will continue to be 
beholden to their biological functions 
in order either to acquire or to main- 
tain legal legitimacy. One can con- 
clude, therefore, that the Guidelines 
accept the masculinist framework en- 
trenched within the Convention refu- 
gee definition. Consequently, getting 
some refugee women claimants 
through the refugee determination 
process will depend heavily upon the 
individuals interpreting the definition. 
Nor is the ground of political opin- 
ion, as suggested by Macklin, and the 
1991 UNHCR Guidelines, a happy al- 
ternative. Although I find arguments 
in favour of political opinion as 
grounds for persecution less compro- 
mising than those for particular socia1 
group, there are still some difficulties 
in describing gender-specific persecu- 
tion in this manner. Macklin's use of 
the term "political" is sufficiently 
broad as to risk rendering all other 
grounds of persecution superfluous. 
Because she refers to patriarchy as a 
system of power (1993,32; 1995), there 
appears to be a connection between the 
use of the word "political" and an un- 
derstanding of power relations, in this 
instance between genders. All refu- 
gees, however, suffer from a power 
imbalance. This state of being is not 
peculiar to women refugees. What is 
specific to some women refugees is the 
way in which the power imbalance 
manifests itself and whether or not this 
manifestation will be recognized as 
persecutory in nature. As Butler (1990) 
notes, one can question the universal- 
ity of gender identity and masculinist 
oppression, both of which assume a 
shared epistemology and shared struc- 
tures of oppression, which need not be 
the case. 
While "the personal is the political" 
is a popular-and often appropriate- 
phrase within western feminist dis- 
course, it is not obvious to me that 
refugee women themselves would 
necessarily provide a similar descrip- 
tion of their actions, behaviour, or vic- 
timization. It is tempting, as Razack 
(1995) writes, to tell stories in a manner 
that will appeal to those in a position to 
make decisions on refugee claims. 
Such an approach can take on subtle 
forms, "as when the cultures of refu- 
gee women are presented as overly 
patriarchal." 
In sum, it is inaccurate, to say the 
least, to group women together on the 
basis of social factors, and it is inappro- 
priate and demeaning to classify them 
on the grounds of biological factors. 
Conclusion 
"Is the construction of the category of 
Women as a coherent and stable sub- 
ject an unwitting regulation and 
reification of gender relations?" asks 
Butler (1990, 5). Does the notion that 
women refugee claimants form a par- 
ticular social group maintain a frame- 
work that is potentially damaging, or 
that perpetuates, inadvertently, a 
power/gender imbalance which en- 
dorses the subordination of women 
refugees within the overriding male 
refugee definition and experience? 
My concern is that by legally defin- 
ing women as a particular social 
group, women's powerlessness and 
marginalization are ensured. It is these 
very characteristics which allow 
women refugee claimants to qualify 
for particular social group status. In a 
strange way, then, the disempower- 
ment of women is cultivated in order 
to legitimate, in the eyes of decision 
makers, their fears-both realized and 
potential-of persecution. 
Men, it must be noted, are not clas- 
sified as a particular social group. That 
this is so brings to mind an observation 
made by Butler (1990,20), who, refer- 
ring to Wittig (1983), writes that "gen- 
der is used in the singular, because 
indeed there are not two genders. 
There is only one: the feminine, the 
'masculine' not being a gender, for the 
masculine is not the masculine, but the 
general." The legitimacy of claiming 
gender-specific persecution should 
not rely upon the subordination of 
women as a whole. 
Gender-specific persecution, I be- 
lieve, should stand alone as a recog- 
nized basis for persecution from which 
some, but luckily not all, women 
suffer. 
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